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ABSTRACT
This article explores how a dynamic performance management (DPM) approach can give policy
makers a more integrated, time-related understanding of how to address wicked problems
successfully. The article highlights how an outcome-based approach to solving wicked policy
problems has to balance three very contrasting objectives of stakeholders in the policy making
process – improving service quality, improving quality of life outcomes and improving conformity
to the principles of public governance. Simultaneous achievement of these three objectives may
not be feasible, as they may form an interactive dynamic system. However the balancing act
between them may be achieved by the use of DPM. Policy insights from this novel approach are
illustrated through a case study of a highly successful co-production intervention to help young
people with multiple disadvantages in Surrey, UK. The implications of DPM are that policy
development needs to accept the important roles of emergent strategy and learning mechanisms,
rather than attempting ‘blueprint’ strategic planning and control mechanisms. Some expectations
about the results may indeed be justifiable in particular policy systems, as clustering of quality of
life outcomes and outcomes in the achievement of governance principles is likely, because
behaviours are strongly inter-related. However, this clustering can never be taken for granted
but must be tested in each specific policy context. Undertaking simulations with the model and
recalibrating it through time, as experience builds up, may allow learning in relation to over-
coming barriers to achieving outcomes in the system.
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Introduction
The public governance literature illustrates how organiza-
tions from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors and
communities need to collaborate to deal with social
“wicked” problems, caused by the dynamic complexity
characterizing today’s societies (Bianchi, 2015; Head &
Alford, 2013; Laegreid&Rykkja, 2014). “Wicked”problems
characterize most of governmental planning, particularly
where social issues are concerned (Rittel&Webber, 1973, p.
160). These are complex policy problems exhibiting high
risk and uncertainty and a high interdependency among
the causal factors. “Wicked” problems cannot be tackled by
any single organization, and they typically spill over admin-
istrative levels and responsibilities. They are characterized
by multilevel, multi-actor, and multi-sectoral challenges.
This dynamic complexity can be due to a variety of
factors. Most important are multiple policy/decision
makers who put different weightings on policy out-
comes, requiring policy trade-offs in time and space;
multiple service pathways affecting the outcomes; deci-
sion levels that are sequentially connected, introducing
rigidities into the system; time lapses between stake-
holder actions and the system’s outcomes; significant
nonlinear relationships between causes and effects; and
the unpredictability and uncontrollability of external
factors (as perceived by policy makers) that may affect
the system’s outcomes.
Moreover, these problems are usually embedded in
major social issues affecting modern life, whose interpreta-
tion is not unambiguous, because it depends on the value
perspectives adopted—and these differ substantially
between stakeholders. Therefore, simply gathering more
information is not sufficient to understand and resolve
them. Wicked problems imply that there are different
interpretations of what the problem is and also that there
are no definitive (i.e., true or false) solutions.
Public administration has always had difficulties in
dealing with wicked problems. This is partly because
many important results take significant time to appear,
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so that, when dealing with wicked problems, policy
makers are prone to tackle short-term symptoms rather
than long-term causes. This often divorces the inter-
ventions of public sector organizations from the out-
comes they seek to achieve and also often results in
sharp disconnections between different institutions and
agencies, given their different processes.
The use of a short-term perspective and a sectoral
approach in the formulation and implementation of stra-
tegies therefore tends to lead to a static view of the system
and to a lack of coordination between different public
agencies, nonprofit and private stakeholders.
This article explores how wicked problems can be more
successfully addressed by policy makers through the use of
dynamic performance management (DPM), in order to
avoid some of these weaknesses of traditional performance
management. The article highlights how an outcome-based
approach to solving wicked policy problems has to balance
three very contrasting objectives of stakeholders in the
policy making process—improving service quality,
improving quality-of-life outcomes, and improving con-
formity to the principles of public governance. It then
demonstrates that this balancing act can be achieved by
the use of DPM, an approach which has up to now only
been applied to a very limited extent in public administra-
tion. Finally, the policy insights which can gained from this
novel conceptual approach are illustrated through a case
study of a highly successful intervention to help young
people with multiple disadvantages in Surrey, UK.
Widening the concept of performance
management: Balancing quality of public
services with public governance to achieve
quality-of-life outcomes
The challenges posed to public administration today by
the many wicked problems it faces require the design
and use of more ambitious and multifaceted perfor-
mance measurement/management systems that can trig-
ger decision makers’ learning and coordination,
strengthen their aptitude in framing dynamic complex-
ity, and support them in pursuing sustainable outcomes.
The knowledge and practice of performance man-
agement has evolved significantly in the past three
decades. In the 1980s, the nascent New Public
Management movement focused on evaluating the so-
called 3 Es (i.e., economy, efficiency, and effectiveness)
of public services (Audit Commission, 1991; Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2011), often with a strong focus on cost
reduction and outsourcing. From the late 1980s, this
was broadened to an interest in how to conceptualize,
measure, assure, and, eventually, improve the quality of
public services (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2015). These
concerns with the 3 Es and service quality remain key
to public sector performance management.
Subsequently, however, there has been considerable
interest in outcome-based public policy making and man-
agement (Heinrich, 2002). The United Kingdom has been
in the forefront of this movement (Bovaird & Davies,
2011), but similar trends have been identified in the USA
(Moynihan, 2005), Australia (Hoque, 2008), and elsewhere
in Europe (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). From the 1950s,
aggregate measures of well-being were developed, includ-
ing the standard of living (UN, 1954) and quality of life
(OECD, 1970). Inmore recent years, theOECDhas been at
the forefront of developing well-being and happiness indi-
cators, through its Better Life Index (http://www.oecdbet
terlifeindex.org/topics/life-satisfaction/). Following on
from this, the UN Sustainable Development Solutions
Network, which publishes the World Happiness Report,
has created an SDG Index to track each country’s progress
toward the UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(Sachs, 2016). This change to quality-of-life outcome mea-
sures has been widely welcomed by policy makers, practi-
tioners, and academics.
Another aspect of the pursuit of better outcomes in the
last 20 years has been a recasting of the age-old concern
with principles of government as “principles of govern-
ance,” and a growing interest in evaluating whether or not
such principles are actually being implemented in practice
—for example, through the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators Project (http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/#home). Since it is a basic axiom of
Western philosophy that “the ends do not justify the
means,”measuring conformity to these principles of gov-
ernance would seem to be an essential complement to
measuring achievement of quality-of-life outcomes.
Building on categorizations of the main public govern-
ance principles and processes by Kooiman (1993), Rhodes
(1997) and Bovaird and Loffler (2003), there is clearly a
need to assess such principles of “good governance” as
citizen engagement, transparency, accountability, human
rights, the equalities agenda and social inclusion (gender,
ethnicity, age, religion, etc.), ethical and honest behavior,
equity (fair procedures and due process), respect for the
rule of law, fair conduct of elections, representation and
participation, and sustainability. These principles and pro-
cesses of public governance are not absolute—their impor-
tance is likely to vary between contexts and over time, and
different stakeholders are likely to have differing views on
what they mean and how important they are. In practice,
this suggests a “governance impossibility theorem”—it is
unlikely that all of these principles can simultaneously be
implemented to desired minimum levels. The assessment
of the achievement of public governance principles has
mainly been undertaken on a piecemeal, principle-by-
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principle basis, with different methodologies developed to
assess transparency and corruption (e.g., by Transparency
International), accountability (e.g., by public audit offices),
partnership working, etc. (Bovaird & Loffler, 2003, 2007).
There are therefore major literatures on performance
measurement focusing on quality of public services,
quality-of-life outcomes, and the achievement of public
governance outcomes. They each claim a high level of
political importance for their subject. This presents us
with a problem—how can these three very different
approaches be integrated? Separate evaluation of each
dimension of performance on its own is unsatisfactory,
as it is piecemeal rather than integrated and static rather
than dynamic. Therefore, this article illustrates how
qualitative DPM modeling can be used to provide gen-
eric insights which can support policy makers in addres-
sing this wicked problem. Such modeling applies the
system dynamics methodology (Forrester, 1961;
Sterman, 2000) to performance management. Within a
supportive learning environment with experienced facil-
itators, policy makers can use the insights from this
DPM approach to enhance their understanding of the
causes and effects related to policies, actions, and tar-
geted results, and to identify when such cause-and-effect
modeling around wicked issues may be inappropriate.
The potential of a dynamic and outcome-based
systems perspective for solving wicked
problems
In the last decade, many OECD countries have started to
develop new approaches that may enable them to deal
effectively with wicked problems. To describe and imple-
ment these processes, both the scientific literature and
practitioners have coined different terms. Among them
are joined-up government (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007,
2013; Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2014), whole-of-
government (OECD, 2005), integrated governance, out-
come steering (Hood, 2005), holistic governance, horizon-
tal management (Peters, 2015), and new public governance
(Osborne, 2010).
To implement such processes, three main sets of
levers have to be synergistically managed by govern-
ments (Borgonovi, 1996):
(1) institutional reforms,
(2) organization structures and performance man-
agement systems, and
(3) cultural and social systems.
In this way, agile governmental systems can be
designed and implemented that can foster a more
pragmatic and intelligent collaboration among different
stakeholders, not only in the public sector domain.
The implementation of such reforms also implies
(at least in theory) the use of an outcome-oriented
view of performance to frame and assess the desir-
ability of policy effects. This approach not only
considers outcomes in the short run but also in
the long run. Furthermore, it not only focuses on
the perspective of a single organization but also on
the perspective of the relevant system which gener-
ates the observed problem behavior, including the
achievement of public governance principles.
A DPM approach is particularly valuable in such con-
texts, since time disjunctions between actions and results,
and nonlinear feedback relationships affecting policy out-
comes, mean that decision makers cannot easily under-
stand the structure and behavior of the systems in which
their polices will be implemented. This approach may
help them to detect the risks of unintended effects of
policies which, although they may look consistent from
a static and sectoral perspective, may fail in the long run
because of lack of coordination or lack of adaptation
(Ghaffarzadegan, Lyneis, & Richardson, 2011).
From this perspective, a number of challenges are
associated with designing dynamic and outcome-based
performance management systems—both inside and
across public sector organizations:
First, such systems should not focus only on the “fixed
period” end results, i.e., net change (“flow”) generated by
the implemented policies in a given time period in the
initial endowment of strategic resources in all the relevant
organizations. Strategic resources are stocks of tangible or
intangible assets available to policy makers to make their
policies successful (Morecroft, 2007; Warren, 2002). Their
dynamics depend on the value of corresponding inflows
and outflows.
While these changes in the strategic resources generated
by the end results are indeed important, they only provide
one, limited snapshot. In order to understand the longer
term workings of the overall system, it is important also to
focus on the performance drivers, i.e., the critical success
factors for achieving these end results. Performance drivers
should be measured and monitored, and, where possible,
changed to a more favorable state, in order to influence the
achievement of desired outcomes.
Performance drivers are measured as ratios between
the current strategic resource levels affecting perfor-
mance and the desired levels (for instance, the “skills/
desired skills” ratio). It is important also to outline the
policy options which are believed to affect the strategic
resources that will influence performance drivers, and
—through them—the end results, which in turn will
feedback on the strategic resources (Figure 1).
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Second, the relevant boundaries of performance man-
agement systems adopted by public sector organizations
should not be limited to a single organization, since an
outcome-based view of performance requires measures
that can gauge the joint impact of all the organizations
which are working together as partners. This implies that a
system-wide view of performance should be combined
with an internal view, by each organization (e.g., a munici-
pality). The interplay of the two views will enhance a
strategic dialogue among the key players, allowing effective
management of each organization and also of the overall
partnership to which it belongs. However, outcomes are
also influenced by the behavior of target groups and wider
communities, modeling of which introduces the concept of
“coproduction.”
Using a dynamic outcome-based perspective to
frame the results of user and community-led
coproduction
In order to use a DPM approach, a conceptual frame-
work is needed to show how the resources from differ-
ent stakeholders (including not only communities and
individual residents and households but also organiza-
tions from the public, private, and third sectors) shape
individual (or household) outcomes and community
outcomes. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The interven-
tions of public, private, and third sector organizations
(TSOs) are complemented by activities of individual
and community coproduction (Bovaird, 2007). We
define coproduction as “professionals and citizens
Figure 1. A dynamic performance management view.
Community
resources
Individual (household)
resources
Public sector
resources
Private &
third sector
resources
Service user
co-production
Community
co-production
Regulation
COLLECTIVE QUALITY OF
LIFE OUTCOMES
Private sector
products and
services
INDIVIDUAL (HOUSEHOLD)
QUALITY OF LIFE OUTCOMES
Individual
self-help
Community
self-organisation
Public governance
principles
Quality of
public services
Figure 2. A conceptual framework for improving public and personal outcomes through coproduction.
Source: Loeffler and Bovaird (2017).
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making better use of each other’s assets, resources and
contributions to achieve to achieve better outcomes or
improved efficiency” (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2016).
Coproduction therefore brings together paid staff
working in public services and citizens who may act
as individuals or households or communities.
Clearly, coproduction (and particularly, community
coproduction) requires a set of agreements as to how
citizens will work with each other and with the public
service provider to improve public outcomes.
Therefore, public governance principles will need to
be defined and operationalized to provide the “rules
of the game” and the agreed processes by which citizens
and organizations will work together.
When communities make a contribution to improve
outcomes, e.g., by providing expertise, resources, and com-
mitment to a public service within an agreed public gov-
ernance framework, this is likely to increase the quality of
the public service. However, not all forms of community
coproduction involve contributing to a public service—in
some cases, the outcome improvement is brought about by
behavior change or public sector support for self-help and
self-organizing. In the case of user-led forms of coproduc-
tion, people accessing public services may improve service
quality through co-commissioning, codesign, co-delivery,
or co-assessing a public service. This usually not only
benefits the coproducing individual but often also
improves the quality of life of other local people.
Of course, Figure 2 is a simplification of the actual
relationships to be found in any specific policy system.
For example, individual service users, where they play a
role in co-commissioning public services, are likely to
influence public governance principles. In another part
of the model, community self-organization may
improve individual household outcomes, not only com-
munity-wide outcomes. These scenarios are ignored in
Figure 2 so that this framework represents a “core”
schematic, on the basis of which more detailed frame-
works can be developed for specific policy systems.
A generic DPM model of a public policy system
involving coproduction
In order to illustrate how the DPM approach can help
address the wicked problem of an interacting set of
governance principles, service quality changes, and
quality-of-life outcomes, a generic model has been
developed, of the type described by Morecroft (1988,
p. 314) “Generic policy models are (usually small)
models which display important dynamic processes
that occur frequently . . . [offering] modelers and policy
makers a way of collecting and storing knowledge
about feedback structure and dynamics of social and
business systems” (Morecroft, 1988, p. 314). Such mod-
els are “dynamic feedback systems that support parti-
cular but widely applicable behavioral insights” (Paich,
1985, p. 127). They are usually developed from a variety
of information sources, such as case studies, published
articles or surveys, personal knowledge, and experience
from practice.
Though such models cannot be directly applied to any
specific context, their value is to provide policy makers
with a selective view of the feedback structure recurring in
several policy domains. Therefore, generic models “are
not appropriate for solving specific problems. . . . [but
rather] educational tools for learning about the funda-
mentals of complex systems . . . [They] can improve policy
making in general by upgrading the quality of a manager’s
mental models” (Paich, 1985, p. 130). They are therefore
learning tools which can support the design and imple-
mentation of DPM systems (Bianchi, 2016; Bianchi &
Rivenbark, 2014), which can enable decision makers bet-
ter to frame trade-offs across time and space.
System dynamics modeling at the “insight” level is
an established practice used to inform understanding of
processes and is highly dependent on graphic demon-
stration (Warren, 2000, 2008; Winch & Joyce, 2006;
Wolstenholme, 1999). It should not be confused with
quantitative parameter-setting modeling, which some-
times occurs as a further stage of analysis.
The point of such modeling is to identify areas
where dynamic factors (i.e., those with feedback effects
within the system) may have important influence on
the way a process occurs. Often, they are factors not
directly within the control of an organization or factors
within the control of the organization but contrained to
operate at a “suboptimal” level.
Consequently, the qualitative system dynamics mod-
eling approach developed in this article is a first step to
designing and implementing a full DPM system. Where
few specific data are available, qualitative modeling
helps the conceptualization of a system’s dynamic com-
plexity, so aiding preliminary policy design and the
development of more sophisticated simulation models
for measurement and policy improvement.
Figure 3 illustrates a generic DPM model of coproduc-
tion activities by service users and local communities in
order to improve the quality of life of local communities or
service users. The figure illustrates one main end result,
namely the change in quality of life experienced by service
users or local communities. This in turn is influenced by
three intermediate end results, i.e., those related to
changes in:
● Quality-of-life outcomes experienced by service
users as a result of their own coproduction activities;
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 837
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● quality-of-life outcomes experienced by service
users as a result of the coproduction activities of
others in their community; and
● commitment by citizens (service users and others
in their community) to the concept of
coproduction.
The performance drivers affecting the first two sets
of outcomes are mostly related to the “attraction pro-
cess” of getting citizens to be more interested in con-
tributing to coproduction. This implies (a) finding what
contributions each service user or other citizen could
make to achieving the results desired and (b) designing
and enabling the conditions which encourage and sup-
port these service users and other citizens to make these
contributions, in a way which will be seen as mutually
valuable. A performance measure that captures the
described “attraction” process, at least partly, is the
time spent on coproduction. The more time spent, the
more committed the person is to coproduction
(although in some negative scenarios, this may simply
reflect an inefficient coproduction process).
In order to bolster this “attraction” process of con-
vincing citizens to coproduce, public sector organiza-
tions must design conditions, promote values, and
create imaginative incentives that enable and induce
service users and other citizens to collaborate. To this
end, better service outcomes and more convenient ser-
vice processes are not enough—they also have to design
approaches which respect governance principles (e.g.,
transparency, due process, equality of treatment,
accountability, sustainability). This may require organi-
zational changes inside the organization and externally
with partners, which may take time to mature. This is
depicted in Figure 3. through the resource accumula-
tion process, whereby the incentives for coproduction
and commitment to governance principles affect the
number of people attracted to become involved in
coproduction.
Increases in citizen’s quality of life are not only
valuable as end results in themselves but also then
form strategic resources, which affect the number of
people in the community who are committed to copro-
duction and how much time they are prepared to
devote to it. In Figure 3., this is shown by the
END-RESULTS
STRATEGIC
RESOURCES
PERFORMANCE
DRIVERS
Change in community
commitment to co-
production
Quality of life
ratio
Change inquality ofl ife outcomes
experienced by service users as an effect
of their co-production activities
Change in quality of life outcomes
experienced by service users as an
effect of the co-production activities of
others in their community
Number of people
interested into co-
production
Number of people
involved into co-
production
Community
commitment
to co-production
Time spent on
co-production
Standard
co-production
initiatives
Innovative
co-production
initiatives
Change in quality of life outcomes
experienced by service users
Perceived community
quality of life
Incentives to community
co-production and
strength of adopted
governance principles
Quality of
services
Quality of
services ratio
Figure 3. A DPM chart framing strategic resources, drivers, and end results, affecting service user and community quality of life
through coproduction.
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“converter” linking the end results to the number of
people interested and involved in coproduction. In this
“attraction” process, there may be a time delay factor,
which means that over time, improvements in the end
results may increase the average time each person allo-
cates to coproduction, and also the stock of people who
are prepared to participate in coproduction initiatives.
A potentially powerful reinforcing loop, which may be
able to trigger the further development of coproduc-
tion, occurs where innovative new coproduction initia-
tives (as a strategic resource) become seen as successful
and therefore “standard” initiatives. This new strategic
resource may itself increase the credibility of coproduc-
tion and therefore further boost the willingness of citi-
zens to participate in coproduction and to spend more
time on it.
A second performance driver is provided by the
“quality-of-life ratio,” which involves a comparison
between the perceived community quality of life and a
benchmark, associated with different alternative mea-
sures (e.g., community expectations, quality-of-life
levels perceived by the community in the past, per-
ceived quality of life in neighboring communities,
etc.). When community quality of life rises, it will
increase this ratio, which in turn is likely to trigger
further credibility of and commitment to coproduction.
Furthermore, this increased commitment may reduce
the outflow from the stock of people involved in copro-
duction (the “attrition” rate).
Though Figure 3 depicts a qualitative and generic or
“insight” DPM model, rather than a detailed, custo-
mized, and quantitative DPM model, it can add value
to policy design, since it can support communication
and coordination among policy makers. In particular,
identifying the variables related to the three different
dimensions of performance, and framing the hypothe-
sized causal pathways leading over time to changes in
the performance drivers and the end results, is critically
important. It allows the identification of design flaws in
the system and interactive feedback effects which have
been ignored or misunderstood. On the back of this
“insight” model, a more detailed and calibrated model
can be developed to support more detailed assessment
of specific policies and a quantitative comparison
between alternative decision sets.
The model in Figure 3 is at quite a high level of
generality in relation to coproduction processes. When
coproduction is analyzed in more detail, separate
approaches can be distinguished which involve relevant
citizens in co-commissioning, codesign, co-delivery,
and co-assessment (Loeffler & Bovaird, 2017). Each of
these four Cos entail a different process by which
citizen involvement can make public services more
cost-effective and more closely aligned to the outcomes
which citizens want. In this case, there may be some
automatic gains in terms of achievement of governance
principles—e.g., transparency is likely to be easier to
achieve, since citizens are more closely involved in
decisions and in actions. Moreover, citizens may be
prepared to trade-off some other governance principles,
as they are closely involved in decisions—e.g., there
may be less need for formal accountability or citizen
engagement mechanisms.
In order to operationalize the model in Figure 3,
performance data at different levels are required.
Performance data on service quality and quality-of-life
outcomes are already gathered (to varying degrees) by
public sector organizations, often following national
government requirements. However, performance data
on achievement of governance principles are usually
collected unsystematically—e.g., data on the equalities
agenda are probably quite good in most public services
but data on transparency or citizen engagement are
much less systematic.
If data to calibrate this model were regarded as a
priority, then appropriate steps could be taken—e.g.,
central government could require a national citizen
survey every 3–5 years to gather citizen feedback on
outcomes and satisfaction with service quality (as was
done in 2006 and 2008 in the United Kingdom). Such a
survey nowadays would be expected also to gather
information on citizen inputs to coproduction
activities.
These data could be used to show that the config-
uration of activities might improve significantly,
depending on whether one is using the standpoint of
the citizen, the professional frontline member of staff,
the top managers of service provider organizations, or
the politicians commissioning the services. In particu-
lar, the absence of data on citizen inputs in fashioning
and assessing the principles of public governance and
in designing and delivering public services mean that
current analyses of social cost-effectiveness and social
rates of return to public sector interventions are greatly
biased toward reduction of public sector inputs, rather
than making best use of citizen inputs.
The next section illustrates how this generic DPM
chart for coproduction can be applied to a case study of
coproducing services for young people (SYP).
Illustrative case study: Surrey SYP
In 2009, SYP in Surrey were seen as vulnerable to
austerity-driven budget cuts. At the same time, a bold
political decision was made to aim for zero NEETs
(under 25s “Not in Education, Employment, or
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Training”), although 10% of all Surrey young people
were highly disadvantaged at that time. This sparked a
radical shake-up of Council services, moving to a new
holistic approach to the well-being of young people,
unique in the United Kingdom (Loeffler, Bovaird,
Van Ryzin, & Timm-Arnold, 2015).
Some services were recommissioned in-house but
the majority were outsourced, almost all to TSOs. The
results were remarkable. Although the overall budget
was cut by over 25%, outcomes improved markedly—a
60% reduction in NEETs (becoming the lowest in
England, and a much faster fall than nationally, which
saw an average 17% reduction during this period), 90%
decrease in first-time entrants to criminal justice sys-
tem, 30% increase in young apprenticeships, and high
satisfaction of young people. Moreover, by 2013, the
number of professional staff working directly with vul-
nerable young people had actually increased.
At an early stage of the transformation process, the
Council identified that for the vast majority of the
approximately 100,000 young people in the county
(Surrey CC, 2010), support from their schools, commu-
nities, and families and the benefits from the success
and affluence of the shire afforded them a successful
transition into adulthood. Many needs were common
to all young people in supporting this transition; edu-
cation, personal and social development, the develop-
ment of identity, exposure to arts and culture as well as
being safe, being healthy, and having fun.
Although Surrey young people experienced low
levels of offending and antisocial behavior, low num-
bers of nonparticipation in education training and
employment (3.9% of 16–19 population), low levels of
teenage conception, low levels of homelessness, and low
levels of substance misuse, the Council nevertheless
believed that this performance did not represent the
world class performance which it expected from its
services, given the affluence in the county.
Despite the high overall level of well-being of young
people in the county, their critical feedback in consul-
tations and engagement work undertaken since 1997
had remained constant—Surrey’s transport network
was difficult to access, expensive, and unreliable; bully-
ing remained an issue; drug and alcohol issues contin-
ued to worry them; and they perceived that they were
treated as a single group—and treated unfairly as a
result. Moreover, their opinions did not appear to
have had an impact on the issues that they faced.
Whilst the majority of young people did make a
successful transition to adulthood, around 10,000
young people, about 1 in 10, had vulnerabilities which
could mean they did not. In 2009, there were 1643
young people in the criminal justice system, 996 not
in education, training, or employment, 608 accessing
drug and alcohol treatment, 374 who experienced
homelessness, and 128 who were excluded from school.
There were also geographical locations and neighbor-
hoods where young people were less likely to make a
successful transition to adulthood; e.g., one-third of
young people not in education training or employment
lived in just 20 electoral wards (out of over 200) and
10,000 young people lived in income deprived homes.
Although data systems did not provide a full picture
of the overlaps in these groups, it could be seen that the
majority of vulnerable young people had multiple
needs. For example, half of all young people not in
education training or employment had some form of
special need and over half of young people within the
youth justice system had a history of low school atten-
dance. Additionally, there were minority groups such as
Roma and traveler young people, gay young people,
young people with learning and physical disabilities,
and young people in council care homes who might
not be vulnerable by definition but nevertheless faced
challenges in making a successful transition that others
might not have to face.
The evaluation of the recommissioning of SYP
(Loeffler et al., 2015) showed that key factors in the
transformation process were externalizing most services
to TSO providers, taking a system-wide approach,
focusing on priority outcomes for most vulnerable
young people, engaging with young people as coprodu-
cers, and working in partnership with other public
commissioners.
Figure 4 provides a simplified insight into the stock-
and-flow structure for a preliminary simulation model,
framing how a DPM approach can enhance the design
and implementation of coproduction strategies. The
figure traces the progress of young people through
education, training, and employment and through the
criminal justice system and the housing system.
More specifically, Figure 4 frames a temporal chain
of experiences of young people in Surrey. A first critical
step in the model is depicted by the two outflows from
the stock of young people who enter into education,
training, or employment. An important target for pol-
icy makers is to maximize the number of young people
who are participants in education, training, or employ-
ment (the so-called PETEs, a system end result). Within
a given time span (e.g., 1 year), the higher this outflow
is, the lower the flow of young people becoming at risk
will be. Among the performance drivers and related
strategic resources affecting this end result are (a)
school system quality, (b) quality and intensiveness of
co-commissioning services by young people, and (c)
quality of the co-assessment of services by young
840 C. BIANCHI ET AL
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
tat
e U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
 Y
or
k a
t A
lba
ny
 (S
UN
Y)
] a
t 0
2:4
6 2
3 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
people, along with how well public agencies respond to
these assessments.
A second critical step in the model is depicted by the
two outflows from the stock of young people at risk.
Here, the main target for policy makers is the number
of young people at risk who become PETE (a system
end result), rather than dropping out. Related to a
given time span (e.g., 1 year), the higher this outflow
is, the lower the flow of young people who become
NEET. Among the performance drivers and related
strategic resources affecting this end result are (a) the
number of young people at risk who get good quality
early advice, (b) the number of young people at risk
who get good quality mentoring, and (c) the quality
and extent of the contribution to the codesign of ser-
vices by young people at risk.
Both these end results (i.e., the number of young
people and of young people at risk who enter into
education, training, or employment) increase the stock
of young people in education and training (a strategic
resource), in a given time period. This stock is then
depleted by the outflow of young people who start
apprenticeships in a given time period (a third end
result). To increase this latter flow, possible perfor-
mance drivers and related strategic resources which
should be developed and deployed by policy makers
are (a) the relevance of education received by young
people, (b) the motivation of young people to develop
their own skills and to contribute to social and eco-
nomic life in the area, and (c) the quality and extent of
the contribution to the codesign of services by young
people.
Another set of critical performance drivers and
related strategic resources shown by the model refers
to the first time entrance of young people into the
criminal justice system. To reduce this flow, policy
makers can act (a) to improve the behavior of local
families exhibiting dysfunctional behavior, (b) to
improve the behavior of the friends and others in the
network of young people at risk who exhibit dysfunc-
tional behavior, (c) to reduce the intensity and fre-
quency of early abuse of alcohol/drugs by young
people who are NEET or at risk of being NEET, and
(d) to improve the quality and frequency of service
codesign by young people in the local area who are
NEET or at risk of becoming NEET.
The model also shows that safe accommodation poli-
cies for young people affect the end results in the area.
The stock of young people with no safe accommodation
influences the stock of young people in education, train-
ing, or employment. The flow of “young people finding
safe accommodation” is affected by performance drivers
and related strategic resources such as (a) the quality and
intensity of family support and (b) the quality and inten-
sity of social security support. The ratio between the
stock of young people with no safe accommodation and
its benchmark or target level provides another critical
driver affecting the major outcome (end result) measure
for the system, namely, the first time entrance of young
people into the criminal justice system.
Figure 4. A simplified and preliminary DPM stock-and-flow model of coproduction in the recommissioned Services for Young People,
Surrey.
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The model in Figure 4 therefore suggests some
dynamic interactions which may have been important
in the success of the Surrey recommissioning program,
beyond the simple introduction of TSO providers,
increased focus on young people who are NEET, or at
risk of becoming NEET, and improved partnership
working with other agencies. Such model provides the
stock-and-flow structure to convert a DPM chart into a
system dynamics simulation model.
As a generic insight model, it frames how the
whole system works, at a macro level—i.e., who are
the main players, which strategic resources they can
affect, how such resources will change the perfor-
mance drivers and end results over time, and how
the end results will change the strategic resource
initial endowment. This allows policy makers to see
the “big picture,” to be explored in subsequent steps
of the modeling process, rather than simply exploring
one “frame” in great detail. Furthermore, it highlights
certain parts of the process which may have played
important roles, although they have not been the
main focus of policy making—e.g., in Figure 4., the
interaction of unsafe accommodation in influencing
how young people who are NEET can become
enmeshed in the criminal justice system by commit-
ting some criminal act or indulging in antisocial
behavior.
Figure 5 frames, through an influence diagram, the
main feedback loops, in order to provide insights to
relevant stakeholders in coproduction to help them to
design and implement sustainable policies. The signs
on the arrows in Figure 5 show both direct and inverse
relationships between variables. A reinforcing loop has
a positive polarity, while a negative polarity implies a
balancing loop (Forrester, 1961). The balancing loop
“B” shows the medium-term outcomes that can be
generated by combining both service co-commission-
ing/codesign and co-delivery/co-assessment policies.
This loop is balancing, since it aims to pursue system
stability, by assuring that coproduction policies will
reduce the stock of young people who are NEET to
the desired level. It describes how attracting more
young people and involving them in co-commissioning
leads (after a delay) to a reduction of the stock of young
people who are NEET. This increases the demand for
coproduction, which boosts energies and efforts toward
the improvement of the quality and intensiveness of
coproduction services (performance drivers). This, in
turn, further develops young people’s participation in
service co-commissioning.
The reinforcing loops “R1,” “R2,” and “R3” show the
amplifying returns that coproduction policies may gen-
erate in the medium–long run. Specifically, the loop
“R1” shows how increasing the number of young peo-
ple involved in co-commissioning will increase the time
spent in coproduction (performance driver). This will
increase community quality of life (long-run outcome
end result) and will attract more young people into
service co-commissioning. (This latter relationship,
however, is not fully proven in the literature—some
studies have shown the opposite relationship; see
Bovaird, Stoker, Loeffler, Jones, & Pinilla Roncancio,
2016.)
The loop “R2” shows how a reduction of young
people who are NEET may decrease (after a delay) the
stock of young people in the criminal justice system.
YOUNG PEOPLE
WHO ARE NEET
DEMAND
FOR CO-
PRODUCTION
+
QUALITY AND
INTENSINENESS OF
CO-PRODUCTION
SERVICES
+
YOUNG PEOPLE PARTICIPATING IN
EET SERVICE CO-COMMISSIONING
+
-
B
TIME SPENT IN
CO-
PRODUCTION
COMMUNITY
QUALITY OF
LIFE
R1
YOUNG PEOPLE
IN JUSTICE
SYSTEMR2
CO-PRODUCTION
INITIATIVES
R3
+
-
+
++
+
+
Figure 5. A simplified influence diagram framing processes and outcomes from coproduction in the recommissioned Services for
Young People, Surrey CC.
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This will increase community quality of life and will
encourage more young people to participate in service
co-commissioning. This will further contribute to
reduce the stock of young people who are NEET.
The loop “R3” describes how more young people
participating in service co-commissioning will increase
the number of coproduction initiatives, which will
further boost the involvement of young people in ser-
vice co-commissioning.
These feedback loops highlight how the dynamic
effects of interventions in “secondary” services (e.g.,
those related to the justice system or to family support,
not directly related to education, training, or employ-
ment interventions) may be key in achieving success in
reducing the number of NEETs. Consequently, as
achievements in one period may derive from interven-
tions in previous periods, evaluation of interventions to
reduce the number of NEETs must take account of the
time paths by which outcomes are achieved. Moreover,
path dependence may characterize the system.
Clearly, innovation in the system, e.g., through
coproduction, entails risks, which also need to be built
into the model. The links depicted in Figures 3 and 4
are not certain to work—they have a probability of
failure attached to them, higher for the more innovative
approaches. This is not an argument to eliminate risk,
since it is usually associated with innovations promis-
ing higher levels of performance. Rather, it suggests the
need also to incorporate resilience, which allows the
different stakeholders (especially service users and ser-
vice providers) to bounce back, once failure does occur
somewhere in the system (Bovaird & Quirk, 2016).
A final set of feedback loops affects the coproduction
activities of young people themselves. These coproduction
activities are likely to contribute significantly to the out-
comes they achieve—and this varies with their motiva-
tion, their experience, and the opportunities which they
are offered. It is also influenced by how convincing they
found the response by the public agencies in the system to
their coproduction in the previous time period. This part
of the model has typically been neglected in public policy.
The Surrey case study suggests that it succeeds best when
it involves one-to-one working between professionals and
vulnerable young people, and peer support and mentor-
ing by young people for each other.
Policy implications
The model presented in this article identifies some
dynamic interactions which may have been important
in the success of the Surrey recommissioning program,
beyond the simple introduction of TSO providers,
increased focus on young people who are NEET, or at
risk of becoming NEET, and improved partnership
working with other agencies. Such a model provides
the logical structures for the next phase of modeling, in
which a DPM chart and an influence diagram are
converted into a quantitative system dynamics stock-
and-flow simulation model, using appropriate local
data, to support strategic learning, communication,
and performance management in the “multi-actor”
context described here.
As a generic insight model, the stock-and-flow struc-
ture portrayed in Figure 4 is purposefully aimed to
frame how the whole system works, at a macro level,
giving policy makers a better grasp of the “big picture”
in a system-wide analysis, rather than simply exploring
one “frame” in great detail.
Moreover, the model identifies feedback loops with
important implications for policy. It highlights how the
dynamic effects of interventions in “secondary” services
(e.g., those related to the justice system, not directly related
to education, training, or employment interventions) may
be key in reducing the number of NEETs, demonstrating
the need for joined-up policymaking and management in
the public agencies dealing with SYP. Again, it demon-
strates that achievements in one periodmay be significantly
affected by interventions in previous periods—evaluation
of interventions to reduce the number of NEETs must take
account of the time paths by which outcomes are achieved.
Moreover, path dependence may characterize the system.
This modeling demonstrates that policy developmentmust
seek balanced effort—over time, between actors, and across
areas, if desired results are to be achieved.
A DPM approach can also usefully support decision
makers in responding to the policy resistance that
dynamic complex systems often embody. This phenom-
enon may imply that after a given set of policies has been
adopted and implemented to fix a problem, the system
may respond by showing a performance improvement in
the short run. However, in the long run, problems may
bounce back, often stronger and more pervasive than in
the past—this can only be successfully tackled if the longer
term system-wide effects are understood.
This conceptual model in Figures 4 and 5 provides a
sound basis for the construction of a full simulationmodel,
allowing policy makers to sketch and explore alternative
scenario plans in designing and implementing coproduc-
tion strategies in the Surrey CC case, with a more detailed
and quantitative analysis, as the next step in a strategic
learning process (Bianchi & Tomaselli, 2015).
Conclusions
This article has explored the different contexts for the
role of public sector decision-making, showing that
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simultaneous achievement of key outcomes, service
quality dimensions, and governance principles may
not be feasible—and that the modeling of the balance
between these different sets of results needs to recog-
nize that they form an interactive dynamic system. This
means that politicians may need to accept that they are
not determining the achievement of optimal outcomes
in a predictable cause-and-effect chain but rather shap-
ing the emergence of acceptable outcomes in a difficult-
to-predict set of system-wide relationships.
Some expectations about the results may be justifi-
able in particular policy systems. For example, quality-
of-life outcomes are likely to cluster, as many outcomes
are strongly inter-related (e.g., poverty and ill-health).
Outcomes in relation to the achievement of governance
principles are also likely to cluster, as many governance
principles are strongly inter-related (e.g., transparency
and accountability). However, this clustering can never
be taken for granted but must be tested in each specific
policy context.
The interactions between service quality, quality-of-
life outcomes, and governance outcomes are likely to be
much harder to predict in advance and may, in some
circumstances, form a complex adaptive system.
Performance improvement simultaneously across
these three sets of policy results is therefore not a policy
goal which can realistically be set. There is therefore a
need for a political decision on what balance between
service quality, quality-of-life outcomes, and public
governance outcomes is desired so that some modeling
can be done to indicate whether this balance is feasible.
This article has provided a novel and practical tem-
plate for developing a conceptual framework which can
support policy makers in the decision-making process.
The complexity and system interdependence high-
lighted by the DPM approach suggests that policy
development needs to accept the important role of
learning and emergent strategies, rather than control
and “blueprint” strategic planning.
The policy intervention system, as shown in Figure 4,
contains feedback loops which have important implica-
tions for policy, as shown in Figure 5. They highlight how
the dynamic effects of interventions can ripple through
the whole policy system, demonstrating the need for
joined-up policymaking and management. They show
that achievements in one period may be significantly
affected by interventions in previous periods—conse-
quently, over-hasty evaluation, or evaluation which only
looks at narrow parts of the system, is likely to lead to
misleading judgments. They show the nature of the risks
which necessarily arise from innovations, such as copro-
duction, and suggest ways in which resilience might be
incorporated in the policy system so that the different
stakeholders can bounce back, once system failure occurs
(as it is bound to happen in any innovative system).
The model needs to be further developed to take
account of the “transaction costs” of coproduction
(and, of course, of traditional service delivery mechan-
isms). These involve, for example, gaining the trust of
the service users and communities, whose coproduction
the public sector wishes to engage. Again, there will be
a need to ensure the employment and motivation of
public services staff who understand and are committed
to coproduction—and similarly to change the values of
other partners. Although it may well be perceived by
many stakeholders that both transaction costs and risks
would be higher under coproduction, providing a bar-
rier to its introduction, it is not clear that this is so.
Providing simulations with the model and recalibrating
it through time, as experience builds up, may allow this
perceived barrier to be addressed. As the time paths of
these changes are currently little understood, DPM may
be a key tool for unpicking the role of transaction costs
in system change, an aspect of policy evaluation which
has been seriously under-researched up to now.
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